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Sex Between People with “Mental
Retardation”: an Ethical Evaluation
BEN SPIECKER & JAN STEUTEL
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT Is sex between people with “mental retardation”[1] morally permissible and, if at
all, under what conditions? This paper tries to answer this question, but only with regard to sex
between biologically mature individuals with mild or moderate mental retardation. First, the
concepts of “sexual activity” and “mental retardation” are analysed brie y, which is challeng-
ing given the widely divergent and sometimes rather awkward de nitions of these concepts. On
the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the liberal principle of mutual consent, if taken as
a necessary condition of permissible sex, has unacceptable consequences for people with mental
retardation. Many forms of sex between them would be morally impermissible, given the fact
that their limited powers of practical reasoning will often make valid consent well-nigh
impossible. As an alternative to the liberal principle of permissible sex, conditions are speci ed
that include the additional consent of caretakers. If people with mental retardation do not have
the capacities of practical deliberation required for valid consent, care providers with mature
reasoning powers should act as their substitutes. Finally, some important implications for the
moral education of future care professionals are spelled out.
Are people with “mental retardation” sexual beings? Do they have, just like people
who are not mentally retarded, sexual desires and sexual feelings? The 9th edition
of Mental Retardation, published by the American Association on Mental Retar-
dation (1992), gives the impression that sexuality plays hardly any role in the life of
people with mental retardation. The Index of the book, which is fairly elaborate,
does not include the word “sexuality” or one of its cognates. As far as we were able
to determine, the word is used three times throughout the book, only in relation to
health and appropriate behaviour, and without any explanation or illustration (pp.
40, 41). This is quite different from the impression given by Dutch specialist
journals for professionals serving those with mental retardation. In the last 20 years
or so many articles have been written on various aspects of the sex life of people with
mental retardation, the practical problems their sexual desires and behaviour give
rise to, as well as the different ways in which those problems could be tackled by
professionals (nurses, social workers, care providers). In nearly all these articles the
right of people with mental retardation to be involved in sexual relationships is taken
for granted. The questions discussed focus rather on what this right means in
different contexts and how it could be implemented in various settings.
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It is remarkable that the articles published in the journals indicated do not make
any reference to publications in the domain of moral philosophy. Many of the
problems discussed (regarding masturbation, pornographic material, visiting prosti-
tutes, assistance of care professionals, etc.) are practical not only in an instrumental
sense but de nitely also in a moral or ethical sense. Nevertheless, no connection is
made with related philosophical discussions, not even with important recent publi-
cations on human sexuality in the  eld of applied ethics (e.g. Belliotti, 1993; Soble,
1996; Archard, 1998; Primoratz, 1999). It is also striking, however, that these
philosophical essays, in which many different forms of sexuality are discussed, do
not offer any systematic evaluation of sex with or between people with mental
retardation. To be sure, incidental reference is made to the “mentally impaired”
(Belliotti, 1993, p. 195) or the “mentally disabled” (Archard, 1998, p. 44), es-
pecially in relation to the topic of consent. In one essay (Archard, 1998, pp. 60–64,
66) sexual relations between professionals and clients are discussed, which may
include sex between professional caregivers and people with mental retardation.
None the less, any direct account of the moral dimensions of sex with or between
mentally retarded people is absent.
Therefore, we have lively ethical discussions on sex and people with mental
retardation without much philosophical depth and rigour, on the one hand, and
sophisticated philosophical discussions on human sexuality without any systematic
attention to people with mental retardation on the other hand. This article’s
intention is to build a bridge between these worlds by trying to determine which
moral principles should guide us in evaluating sexual behaviour of people with
mental retardation. For practical reasons, however, the scope of our undertaking will
be limited. Our ethical re ections will be con ned to sexual interactions between
adults with mental retardation, which means, roughly, that three important aspects
of sexuality in connection with mental retardation are not taken into account.
First, nothing will be said about sex between people with mental retardation
and those who are not mentally retarded. Elsewhere (Spiecker & Steutel, 2000) we
have discussed sex between people with mental retardation and providers of sexual
services, both professional and non-professional (which is, in our view, morally
permissible under particular circumstances), as well as sex between individuals with
mental retardation and care professionals (which is, we argued, under no condition
morally acceptable); but here we shall focus only on sex between people with mental
retardation. Secondly, no attention will be paid to sexual behaviour of children with
mental retardation. Later on we shall argue that the child–adult distinction may be
drawn in different ways, depending on the perspective taken. In this context we are
referring to the biological perspective, according to which the end of puberty is the
line of demarcation between childhood and adulthood. Our focus will be on adults
only, in the biological sense of the term: that is, on mentally retarded people with
fully developed primary and secondary sexual characteristics. Thirdly, in scienti c
publications often different levels of mental retardation are distinguished, in particu-
lar between mild, moderate, severe and profound mental retardation (e.g. Hickson
et al., 1995, pp. 46–51). Although this classi cation is far from unproblematic, it
may be useful for demarcating the group of people we are discussing. Our ethical
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evaluation is restricted roughly to sexual behaviour of people with mild or moderate
mental retardation (IQs from 35/40 to 70). Individuals who have severe or profound
mental retardation (IQs below 35/40) do show sexual behaviour, which is mainly
self-directed but sometimes also directed at other human beings. However, contrary
to people assigned to the “higher” levels of mental retardation, they seem to lack the
mental equipment for the kind of reciprocity involved in sexual interaction, such as
elementary role-taking abilities and a clear differentiation between the self and
others.
Given this brief subject demarcation, the principal question of our article can be
formulated as follows: is sex between adults with mild or moderate mental retar-
dation morally permissible and, if at all, under what conditions? Before attempting
to provide an answer to this question we shall, in the next section, analyse brie y its
central concepts, in particular the concept of sex and the concept of mental
retardation. The moral principles we are looking for apply to sexual behaviour, but
what are the criteria on the basis of which sexual activities can be distinguished from
non-sexual ones? Especially with regard to a life world in which physical contact and
bodily communication are salient, it is important to obtain a reasonably clear idea
of these criteria. Perhaps even more important is a preliminary analysis of the
concept of mental retardation, not only because quite different de nitions have been
proposed and defended in scienti c and specialist literature, but also because an
adequate view of the distinguishing characteristics of being mentally retarded might
force us to amend moral conceptions of human sexuality that are prevalent in
philosophical circles. With reference to the results of these analyses we shall, in the
subsequent section, attempt to provide an answer to the central question. We shall
argue that the principle of mutual consent cannot do all the ethical work it is often
supposed to do. Our claim will be that valid consent should not be taken as a moral
requirement for sexual interaction between people with mental retardation. On the
basis of our moral views we shall, in the  nal section, indicate brie y the kind of
moral education that should be part of the curriculum for prospective care profes-
sionals.
Conceptual Conditions
What is a sexual act? Any de nition of sexual activities purely in terms of particular
physical or bodily characteristics seems to be doomed from the start (cf. Wilson,
1995, pp. 126–128; Soble, 1996, pp. 117–119). Take, for example, the view that
sexual acts by their nature involve physical contact with the sexual or reproductive
organs. It will be clear that the conditions stated in this de nition are far from
suf cient. Not all activities which involve such physical contact are sexual—for
instance, particular forms of medical examinations or surgical operations. Neither
are the conditions indicated necessary. Forms of physical contact which do not
involve the sexual or reproductive organs may surely be sexual. Indeed, many acts,
such as  irting visually or whispering suggestively, can be sexual without involving
any bodily contact at all.
These and similar  aws of other de nitions of the same kind have stimulated
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philosophers to de ne sexual acts in terms of speci c psychic or mental characteris-
tics, such as sexual desire, arousal, feeling and pleasure. Probably the best-known
de nition of this particular kind is the one framed by Alan H. Goldman (1977, p.
268): “(…) sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the
pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to ful ll
such desire of the agent”. Whatever one may think of Goldman’s de nition and the
additional explanation he offers, we believe that his attempt to give a neutral analysis
of the concept of sexual activity should be applauded. Too often the concept of sex
is confused with normative conceptions about sexuality, not only with particular
views of morally good sex but also with ideas about good sex in a non-moral sense.
In analysing the concept of sexual activity we should discriminate carefully between
conceptual and normative conditions, that is, between the conditions that make an
act a sexual act and the conditions which make a sexual act a good act. This is exactly
what Goldman is trying to accomplish.
Yet his de nition is not acceptable as it stands, partly because some background
normative view of good sex still seems to distort his analysis. With reference to
several critical accounts of Goldman’s analysis (Soble, 1997, pp. 73–75, 1998, pp.
12–14; Primoratz, 1999, pp. 41–49), we shall raise four points of criticism. The  rst
two points show that some of the conditions stated are not necessary (the de nition
is too narrow), while the last two points are meant to demonstrate that taken
together the conditions are not suf cient (the de nition is too broad).
First, some activities are clearly sexual but do not tend to ful l a desire for
contact with another person’s body. For example, solitary masturbation may be the
expression of a desire for contact with another person’s body but obviously does not
tend to ful l such a desire. The same holds true of certain forms of fetishism (such
as fondling shoes) and perversions (such as coprophagia). Goldman’s linking of
sexual acts with the indicated desire seems to express his preference for a particular
type of sex and therefore affects the neutrality of his analysis. Secondly, even if we
would replace Goldman’s de nition of sexual desire for a more appropriate one, his
de nition of sexual activity would still be untenable. He claims that sexual activity
tends to ful l a sexual desire of the agent, but many activities that we identify as
sexual are neither the expression nor the ful lment of the agent’s sexual desires.
Take, for example, a prostitute who is strongly disgusted by performing fellatio. Her
performing fellatio on a man is clearly a sexual act, but it would be hard to
demonstrate that the act tends to ful l her sexual desires. The reason why we call the
act sexual rather pertains to the fact that it tends to arouse or satisfy a sexual desire
of another person. For the very same reason a care professional who masturbates a
severely spastic person with mental retardation is performing a sexual act, even if the
act does not at all tend to ful l or arouse a sexual desire of the care professional.
Thirdly, on Goldman’s de nition an act is sexual if it tends to ful l a desire for
pleasures produced by contact with another person’s body. Some activities, how-
ever, do seem to ful l such a desire without being sexual. Activities such as
wrestling, romping, cuddling and hugging are often not sexual but none the less may
be performed because they involve physical contact that is pleasurable in itself.
Therefore, a weak point of Goldman’s analysis is that it fails to discriminate between
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sexual pleasures and other kinds of bodily pleasures. A desire for contact with
another person’s body will be sexual only if it is a desire for the sexual pleasures such
physical contact brings. Fourthly, even if particular activities do ful l a person’s
sexual desire by producing sexual pleasure, they still may not be sexual by nature.
What also seems to be necessary is that such activities are performed with the
intention of ful lling sexual desire. Actions such as hugging, fondling and giving
massage may ful l sexual desire by generating sexual pleasure, but we feel reluctant
to call them “sexual” if those pleasures are produced completely inadvertently.
Washing a person with mental retardation may produce sexual pleasures, but if the
professional caretaker does not have any intention to do so, it can hardly be regarded
as a sexual act.
These counter-examples force us to frame another de nition of sexual acts, at
least if we want to hold on to Goldman’s intention not to offer a stipulative but a
descriptive de nition of the term concerned. An alternative analysis, which is in our
view more adequate, is that sexual desire is desire for sexual pleasure, and sexual
activity is activity which tends to, and is intended to, arouse or ful l such desire of
the agent or of someone else. This de nition is not susceptible to the points of
criticism given above. According to our alternative de nition of sexual desire,
solitary masturbation and the indicated forms of fetishism and perversions should be
identi ed as sexual activities. Although they do not tend to ful l a desire for the
pleasure of contact with another person’s body, they do plainly tend to ful l the
agent’s desire for sexual pleasure. Moreover, by also introducing sexual desires of
other people than the agent, activities that do not give the agent any sexual pleasure
but ful l the sexual desire of someone else, such as the indicated activities of the
prostitute, are rightly called sexual. Furthermore, activities such as wrestling and
cuddling, even if accompanied by intense bodily pleasures, should not be identi ed
as sexual so long as these pleasures are not of a sexual nature. Lastly, our analysis
implies that activities which may tend to arouse or ful l sexual desire but are not
intended to do so, such as forms of touching, rubbing and caressing which inadver-
tently produce sexual pleasure, are not to be counted in the class of sexual activities.
Although our de nition is not affected by the counter-examples we produced to
tackle Goldman’s analysis, we do not want to deny that it has its own dif culties.
For example, our analysis of both “sexual activity” and “sexual desire” appeals to
the concept of sexual pleasure, and the trouble with taking the latter concept as
logically more basic is that rather complicated concepts are explained in terms of a
concept that is perhaps even more elusive. For if “sexual pleasure” is not to be taken
as a primitive concept, what exactly is the difference between contact that produces
sexual pleasure and that which produces some other pleasure? Primoratz (1999, pp.
46–47), who also de nes sexual desire as desire for sexual pleasure, tries to specify
the latter notion by linking it with arousal experienced in the sexual parts of the
body; but could we identify which parts of the body are sexual without appealing,
not even implicitly, to mental dispositions and phenomena such as sexual desire and
sexual pleasure?
This is not the place to go into such dif culties, however. Following on
Goldman’s intentions, we attempted to offer a de nition of “sexual activity” that
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is as neutral as possible. On ideological or religious grounds one could produce a
de nition that links sexuality with communication and love or, even more restric-
tively, with marriage and reproduction, as a consequence of which many people with
mental retardation do not seem to be sexual beings at all. But if one tries to evade
such ideological distortions by offering a neutral analysis, as we did, people with
mental retardation appear as they are: individuals who may be involved in sexual
activities because, just like other human beings, they have sexual desires and are able
to enjoy sexual pleasures (cf. Bosch, 1995).
Also constitutive of our central question is the concept of mental retardation.
Analysing this concept involves explicating the distinctive characteristics of being
mentally retarded, particularly those that are fundamental in two different respects.
First, they have to explain the various limitations in adaptive behaviour referred to
in operational de nitions of “mental retardation”. For example, the de nition
framed by the American Association on Mental Retardation (1992, pp. 5–6, 38–41)
refers to limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas such as communication,
self-care, home living, health and safety. An analysis of the concept of mental
retardation has to explain why people with mental retardation have the limitations
indicated in coping with the ordinary challenges of everyday living in the com-
munity. Secondly, the characteristics to be revealed also have to justify various
practices of special treatment of people with mental retardation. To challenge the
so-called defect model, the Dutch Federation of Parents’ Associations (1989)
decided to refer to the mentally retarded as “people with possibilities”, but how
could such a de nition offer any justi cation of the different forms of special
treatment the Federation is advocating, such as forms of additional support and
services beyond those provided to people who are not mentally retarded? Treating
people with mental retardation differently from those who are not mentally retarded
cannot be vindicated by indicating similarities, but needs to be justi ed by pointing
out morally relevant distinctions (cf. Bayles, 1985). Precisely these distinctions are
the focus of attention in analysing the concept of mental retardation.
In our view, the distinctive characteristics of being mentally retarded should be
located in certain limitations or de ciencies in the sphere of practical rationality.
Stated crudely, practical reason is the capacity of determining and weighing the pros
and cons of different actions one might perform under the circumstances, with the
intention of determining which alternative is the right, most desirable or virtuous
one. Two basic types of practical rationality might be distinguished, namely pruden-
tial and moral thinking. Typical of the former type of deliberation is that the various
options are assessed in terms of self-regarding considerations, that is, in terms of
reasons which refer to the interests or long-term welfare of the agent herself. In the
latter type of practical thinking the pros and cons are in the end other-regarding, that
is, referring to the welfare or intrinsic dignity of other people than the agent. Our
claim is that certain faults or limitations in both prudential and moral thinking are
distinctive of people with mental retardation. These de ciencies in practical reason-
ing both explain their adaptive skill limitations and justify particular forms of special
treatment.
However, nobody’s practical thinking is perfect. We all make mistakes and
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show de ciencies in thinking about matters of prudence and morality. So what
exactly are the limitations in practical rationality that are typical of people with
mental retardation? Perhaps the best way to approach this question is by introducing
some criterion on the basis of which the deliberative capacities of people with mental
retardation have to be judged as defective. The criterion we have in mind is
obviously not some elevated, virtually unattainable ideal of practical rationality, such
as Aristotle’s conception of the fully virtuous person or Kant’s ideal of moral
autonomy. If we take such an ideal of practical wisdom as a starting-point, not only
the reasoning powers of people with mental retardation but almost everyone’s
capacities of practical reasoning have to be regarded as in some way defective. Our
criterion for determining whether or not someone’s powers of practical deliberation
are de cient is much more realistic, in such a manner that it can be attained by the
major part of humankind. It is the criterion of adulthood. In other words, our claim
is that the deliberative capacities of people with mental retardation are defective in
relation to the powers of practical reasoning of the one who is rightly considered to
be an adult.
A brief account of the distinction between childhood and adulthood may be
helpful in explaining the implications of our criterion. In the opening section, when
we demarcated the subject matter of our ethical evaluations, we drew the line
between childhood and adulthood from a biological point of view. Here, however,
we do not use the terms in a biological sense, but take them as denoting so-called
status concepts (Schapiro, 1999, pp. 717–718). Calling an individual a child or an
adult, in the status meaning of those terms, implies logically making claims, however
implicitly, about which ways of treating the person are proper or improper, legit-
imate or illegitimate. For example, attributing to someone the status of a child
normally implies that particular forms of paternalistic guidance and moral supervi-
sion are seen as desirable or even required. Because being a child is the opposite of
being an adult, treating a person with the status of an adult in a similar way would
be improper and could even be deeply insulting. The reason why the indicated forms
of treating children are seen as appropriate or required is that the child’s capacities
of practical reasoning are de cient or underdeveloped, not, or at least not primarily,
in relation to some ideal of human perfection, but compared with the rather
mundane level of practical rationality associated with the status of adulthood.
Because adults are supposed to be generally capable of determining for themselves
which kind of conduct has to be regarded as prudent or moral under the circum-
stances, they do not need the paternalistic guidance and moral supervision that is
generally seen as appropriate with regard to children (cf. Archard, 1993, pp. 51–53,
64–69; Steutel & Spiecker, 2000, pp. 330–331).
To prevent misunderstandings it is important to make a distinction between
two different types of status concepts, which may be called conventional and
fundamental, respectively (cf. Schapiro, 1999, p. 715). Mainly for practical reasons,
the distinction between children and adults is drawn on the basis of conventional
standards, especially quantitative criteria. For example, porn shows are legally open
to adults only, and according to the law one counts as an adult if one has reached
the age of 18 years. It will be clear that our analysis does not relate to such
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quantitative criteria but focuses on the fundamental, qualitative distinction between
childhood and adulthood. Conventional applications of “child” and “adult” may be
fully in line with fundamental applications, but there may also be remarkable
discrepancies between them. A person who has the status of a child according to
conventional criteria may have the adult status according to fundamental criteria,
and vice versa, depending on whether or not the person’s powers of practical
reasoning are mature or fully developed. It is also important to notice that children
may function as adult people within a particular domain, while still functioning as
children in other spheres of life. For example, according to both conventional and
fundamental criteria, a person may have the status of a child with regard to the
political domain, and at the same time have the status of an adult with respect to the
sexual sphere of life.
On the basis of this brief account of the child–adult distinction, people with
mental retardation could be de ned as human beings who are lacking to a certain
extent the capacities of practical reasoning implied in having the status of an adult.
Moreover, different from most children who are not mentally retarded, children with
mental retardation will not fully grow into persons who have the deliberative powers
typical of adulthood. Due to their signi cantly subaverage intellectual capabilities,
their powers of practical reasoning will permanently show at least some of the
limitations that are distinctive of the status of being a child. This is the reason why
they are to a certain extent, and with regard to more or less domains of discretion,
permanently dependent on the paternalistic guidance and moral supervision of adult
caregivers. Nowadays it is almost common practice to stimulate people with mental
retardation to determine for themselves how to lead their own lives wherever they
can (cf. Dinerstein et al., 1999). In our view, this policy should be supported
forcefully, because mentally retarded people have been denied the opportunity of
making their own choices all too often, and in respect of too many domains. But if
no form of authoritative guidance in matters of prudence or morality is seen as
proper or is no longer required, the people concerned are by de nition not mentally
retarded.
Moral Conditions: the principle of additional consent
During the last four decades or so moral views on sexuality have changed drastically
in the Netherlands. As late as the 1960s marriage and reproduction were generally
taken as the principal criteria of permissible sexual behaviour. Nowadays the
common practice is to appraise sexual activities on the basis of liberal principles, in
particular the principle of mutual consent. The prevailing view is that any kind of
sexual practice is morally permissible, including sex before marriage and sex without
any possibility of procreation, as long as the people concerned have given their
consent and no signi cant harm is caused to third parties.
Although the principle of mutual consent is widely endorsed nowadays, albeit
often implicitly, its interpretation is far from unproblematic (cf. Soble, 1996;
Archard, 1998). A  rst major problem is how exactly the notion of consent should
be interpreted. It will be clear that not every instance of consent will be valid; that
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means, a form of consent which makes a sexual practice morally permissible, at least
prima facie. For example, the fact that someone has consented to having sex under
serious threat or severe pressure can hardly be taken as a good reason for considering
the sex morally legitimate; but what exactly are the conditions which validate the
consent of a person? The standard view in liberal circles is that valid consent is freely
given, on the basis of appropriate information, by someone with mature powers of
judgement. Correspondingly, the conditions which are regarded as invalidating an
act of consent are coercion, fraud, as well as underdeveloped capacities of delibera-
tion (cf. Archard, 1998, pp. 44–53).
So far so good; but obviously the next question is how these validating and
invalidating conditions should be interpreted. At this point opinions are beginning
to diverge considerably, also in liberal circles. Take, for example, the notion of
coercion and the corresponding notion of voluntariness. Some philosophers are
inclined to de ne the notion of coercion rather restrictively, in such a manner that
only serious threats, such as threats of killing or in icting bodily injury or grave
economic harm, are coercive to a degree which makes consent involuntary and
therefore invalid. Others, in particular radical feminists, de ne the notion of
coercion so broadly that whenever a woman has sex with a man for some extrinsic
reason, and not out of her own genuine affection and desire, she is coerced and
therefore also raped. However, going into these and related discussions would lead
us too far a eld. Here we simply want to point out that an interpretation of the
(in)validating conditions should be capable of standing the responsibility test. If we
accept the claim that particular circumstances should be taken as invalidating an act
of consent, we also must be able to subscribe to the view that the person concerned
cannot be held responsible, or at least not fully responsible, for what she did. If we
hold someone fully accountable for her sexual behaviour, it would be inconsistent
also to claim that the person’s consent was somehow invalid. The invalidating
conditions that have to do with coercion and fraud belong to the class of excusing
conditions (which block responsibility for particular acts the agent has performed),
whereas the absence of mature deliberative capacities can better be regarded as an
exempting condition (which makes it inappropriate to hold the agent accountable
more generally) (cf. Wallace, 1994, pp. 118, 154).
Another major problem is whether the principle of mutual consent provides
suf cient conditions of moral permissibility. Is it enough for some sexual interaction
to be morally legitimate that it is consensual? Or can we point out sexual practices
that comply with the principle of mutual consent but nonetheless are morally
unacceptable or at least morally dubious? Which answer will be given to these
questions is obviously dependent on how the (in)validating conditions are inter-
preted. The broader the de nition of terms such as “coercion” and “fraud”, the
greater the chance that the principle will be suf cient. We could even decide to make
the principle suf cient by stretching these terms wherever necessary. However, if we
take our common sense views on moral responsibility as a criterion for testing the
validity of consent, we have to admit that valid consent is not enough for making
every form of sexual activity morally permissible. The consent of the people involved
may be valid because they are fully responsible for what they do, but none the less
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the sexual interaction may be morally reprehensible because one person is exploiting
the other person; for example, by taking undue advantage of the other person’s
vulnerabilities, dire needs, limited alternatives or meagre circumstances. To cover
these cases we need a second moral principle, which may be called the principle of
non-exploitation (Spiecker & Steutel, 1997, pp. 336–337).
A third major problem is whether compliance with the principle of mutual
consent is necessary for making the sexual activity morally permissible. Is sexual
interaction always morally wrong if no valid consent is given? Raymond Belliotti
answers this question in the af rmative, as may be deduced from the moral test he
proposes: “Have the parties, possessing the basic capacities necessary for auton-
omous choice, voluntarily agreed to a particular sexual interaction without force,
fraud, and explicit duress? If the answer is negative then we need go no further: the
sexual act is morally impermissible” (Belliotti, 1993, pp. 199–200). Although he
grants that critics might conjure hypothetical counterexamples (e.g. saving 10 other
people’s lives or preventing 10 other rapes by raping one person), he sticks to the
deontological view that non-consensual sex can never be morally justi ed, not even
in the extreme situations referred to (pp. 196–199).
We believe, however, that circumstances can be pointed out under which
non-consensual sex is morally permissible. The counter-examples Belliotti discusses
are far-fetched and even bizarre. Although he suspects that with suf cient ingenuity
and care more realistic examples could be given, none of these are actually offered.
But what about sex between people with mental retardation? If valid consent is taken
as a necessary condition of moral permissibility, many cases of sexual interaction
between people with mental retardation should be deemed morally wrong, not
because the people involved are somehow coerced or deceived, but because their
capacities of judgement are de cient. Of course, which level of practical rationality
is required by the principle of mutual consent is a matter in dispute. But if we take
the status of adulthood as our criterion, as we should, we may assume that people
with moderate mental retardation are generally lacking the powers of judgement
required for valid consent, while the deliberative capacities of people who are mildly
mentally retarded will not be suf cient for valid consent in relatively complex
situations.
In other words, particular forms of sex between people who are mentally
retarded could be presented as real-life counter-examples. According to our con-
sidered moral intuitions, these examples cannot be brushed off but really do refute
the claim that the principle of mutual consent provides necessary conditions of
morally permissible sexual conduct. It goes without saying that not all forms of
non-consensual sex between people with mental retardation are morally permissible.
This is only the case if certain conditions are ful lled, and rather paradoxically these
conditions are fully consistent with the spirit of the principle of mutual consent.
What are these moral conditions?
A  rst, obvious but very important condition is that the people with mental
retardation express in word or deed that they want to have some form of sexual
interaction with each other. Although ex hypothesi their consent is not valid, and
therefore not suf cient for making the sexual contact morally permissible, it is surely
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required morally. One might argue that the mutual desire for sexual contact should
be persistent, or at any rate be more than merely an incidental impulse; but if one
of the people involved does not want to have sex with the other person, even only
temporarily, the mutual consent that is necessary for making the sex morally
legitimate is absent. A second condition is that the people concerned are somehow
supervised (occasionally or on a daily basis) by adults who know them well. They
have caretakers who are fully entitled to the status of adulthood and who are
acquainted with their patterns of behaviour, their fears and longings, as well as the
things they experience as pleasurable or worthwhile. Thirdly, these caregivers should
imagine themselves in the position of the people with mental retardation, and
consider carefully whether they, if they were those retarded people themselves,
would have consented voluntarily to the sexual interaction. The care providers are
compensating for the more or less limited deliberative capacities of those who are
mentally retarded, by trying to evaluate the situation on their behalf, that is, in terms
of the wishes, goals and values of the retarded people and not on the basis of their
own conception of the good. In fact, such an evaluation will be tantamount to
weighing the pros and cons of the sexual interaction for the parties involved, and will
only result in substitutive consent if, in the end, the bene ts for both parties are seen
as outweighing the disadvantages. A fourth condition is that the caretakers should
try to  nd out whether or not the sexual interaction between the people with mental
retardation will show elements of exploitation. Even if the interaction will be in the
interest of both parties, according to the principle of non-exploitation the bene ts of
the interaction for one party should not be disproportionately meagre in comparison
with the pro ts for the other party.
The essence of our proposal is that sexual interaction between people who are
moderately mentally retarded, and sexual interaction between individuals with
mild mental retardation in relatively complex situations, is only morally permissible
under adult supervision that is both moral and paternalistic. The supervision
is paternalistic because it consists in exercising some form of control on the basis
of prudential considerations, that is, on the basis of reasons which refer to the
interests or the long-term welfare of the people with mental retardation. In a
substitutive way caretakers have to examine whether the sexual interaction, all things
considered, is advantageous to the parties concerned. The supervision is moral
because it is based on considerations which relate to the possibility of mutual
consent and the absence of exploitation. As substitutes caregivers have to  nd out
whether the interests of the parties concerned do justify a hypothetical voluntary
consent and, if so, whether the pro ts for the parties are fairly balanced. If the results
of the substitutive deliberations are positive, if, in other words, there are good
reasons for believing that the sexual interaction will be proportionally pro table to
both parties, no justi ed moral objections to the interaction can be raised. On the
contrary, prohibiting such sexual activities, for example on the basis of ideological or
religious convictions, is inconsistent with the fundamental moral principle of
bene cence and therefore should itself be regarded as morally condemnable.
Because the substitutive judgement of a particular care provider is a necessary
condition for making the sex morally legitimate, the moral principle we proposed
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could be called the principle of substitutive consent. It should be emphasised,
however, that also the mutual consent of the people with mental retardation is
morally required. Therefore the caregiver functions as a kind of additional decision-
maker and the moral principle could perhaps better be termed the principle of
additional consent.
David Archard (1998, p. 80) also questions the claim that valid consent should
be taken as a necessary condition of morally permissible sex. Just as we did, he
argues that the principle of mutual consent is implausible if it should be read as
implying that non-consensual sex is always morally wrong; but his argument is
somewhat different from ours. According to Archard some relationships, particularly
those that are characterised by a very high degree of mutual trust and understanding,
are “beyond consent”. Within such a relationship, Archard maintains, sexual inter-
action is morally permissible without explicit or tacit consent of the parties involved.
He even believes that it would be wrong to insist that a relationship which lies
“beyond consent” should be or become consensual (1998, pp. 25–27).
We agree with Archard that the type of relationship indicated, just as sex
between people with mental retardation, should be taken as a genuine counter
example against the view that consensuality is a necessary condition of permissible
sex. Moreover, both counter-examples are consistent with the spirit of the principle
of mutual consent, as they can both be regarded as implying some kind of hypothet-
ical consent. A relationship “beyond consent”, says Archard, “is one whose parties
would consent to their sexual interaction even though they do not, in fact, do so”
(p. 27; cf. p. 44); but besides these similarities also important differences can be
pointed out. In a relationship “beyond consent” those who assume that the parties
are hypothetically consenting are the parties themselves, whereas the assumption that
people with mental retardation are hypothetically consenting is made by an outsider,
namely the caretaker. This point of difference between the counter-examples is
related to another dissimilarity, which can be revealed by spelling out the if-clause
of the respective hypothetical judgements. In a relationship “beyond consent” the
parties would have consented validly if asked to give their opinion, whereas in cases
of sexual interaction between people with mental retardation the parties would have
consented validly if their deliberative capacities had been mature. What these
if-clauses show is that people involved in a relationship “beyond consent”, in
contradistinction to people with mental retardation, are supposed to have the full
status of an adult.
Some Final Notes on the Moral Education of Care Professionals
As may be deduced from our conceptual analysis and ethical evaluation, profession-
als who serve those with mental retardation have the dif cult task of compensating
for their limited capacities of practical reasoning under certain circumstances.
Because both prudential and moral thinking of people with mental retardation are
more or less de cient, care professionals have to act as their substitutes by doing part
of the thinking for them. This complicated task makes professional caregivers at least
partly responsible for the activities of individuals with mental retardation. Limited
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deliberative capacities do function as an exempting condition for holding someone
fully responsible. Having the task of compensating for such limitations implies being
responsible as a substitute to a certain extent.
Care professionals also have the task of watching closely the often subtle
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate supervision. Although the delibera-
tive capacities of people with mental retardation are somehow limited by de nition,
they should have the opportunity to arrange their own lives as they see  t wherever
they can. Supervision is required to prevent serious prudential and moral derail-
ments but can also be debilitating and repressive. Indeed, the presumption that
people with mental retardation need prudential and moral supervision can be
self-con rming. Inappropriate supervision can make them dependent on their care-
takers instead of stimulating them to express their competences or acquire more
mature capabilities (cf. Archard, 1993, pp. 31, 49, 68). In other words, care
professionals not only have the task of thinking and deciding on behalf of people
with mental retardation, they also have the task of determining when such additional
thinking and deciding is called for.
Obviously, everyone who wants to become a care professional needs to be
prepared for these complex tasks. With regard to the sexual life of people with
mental retardation, being able and disposed to perform these tasks properly will
roughly be tantamount to having the mental qualities needed for applying and
maintaining the principle of additional consent. Consequently, promoting these
qualities should be considered part and parcel of the preparation of students for their
future job as care professionals. Because the indicated qualities are needed for
applying and upholding a moral principle, promoting them has to be regarded as a
central aim of their moral education. It includes three important components.
First, prospective care professionals should acquire the capacity to determine
whether or not the principle of additional consent is applicable. As we have indicated
above, the principle applies only to people with mental retardation who do not have
the adult reasoning powers required for valid consent, so professional caretakers
should be able to determine whether or not the people concerned are capable of
giving valid consent to the form of sex they desire. Our conjecture is that people with
moderate mental retardation generally lack the deliberative capacities required for
valid consent in matters of sexual interaction, while the powers of judgement of
people who are mildly retarded will be insuf cient only if rather complex consider-
ations or decisions are called for. Where exactly to draw the line is a contentious
issue.
Secondly, those trained to become care professionals should also acquire the
capacity to test the desired form of sexual interaction against the principle of
additional consent. If the principle is deemed to be applicable, professional caretak-
ers have the responsibility of determining whether or not they can give their
substitutive consent. In order to acquire the capacity to perform this task properly,
students need to be trained to do a lot of different things, such as determining what
kind of sex is actually wanted, revealing possible forms of coercion, deception or
exploitation, as well as weighing the effects of the sexual interaction in terms of the
interests of the people concerned.
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Thirdly, future care professionals should acquire the capacity to take appropri-
ate measures if the desired form of sexuality is contrary to the principle of additional
consent. If the principle is applicable and substitutive consent can be given no
intervention of care professionals is needed, except for giving the proper support to
the people concerned; but if the desired form of sexual interaction contravenes the
principle of additional consent, professional caretakers should try to prevent the
people from having that kind of sex. It is important that future care professionals are
trained to in uence the people in the most humane and respectful way under such
circumstances. In particular, they should try to persuade the people to refrain from
the sex they want by explaining them as clearly as possible what is wrong with it.
Using coercive power should be seen as a last resort, to be considered only if
persuasion backed up with trust and authority turns out to be ineffective. Because
using force is a highly intrusive action, allowing the people to have the sex, even
though it is contrary to the principle of additional consent, may be the morally best
thing to do; particularly if the harmful consequences of the sexual interaction are
moderate, coercive power may be a remedy that is worse than the disease.
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NOTES
[1] We know that many people, especially in the United Kingdom, consider the term “people with
mental retardation” to be stigmatising and offensive. For that reason they prefer other expressions,
in particular the term “people with learning disabilities” (or “learning dif culties”). None the less
we opt for the former term, partly because it is widely regarded as the proper one in the United
States, and partly because the latter term is much too broad and therefore may give rise to
misunderstanding. Obviously the term “people with mental retardation” is used in this article in a
non-pejorative sense.
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